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DIALETHEISM AND THE IMPOSSIBILITY
OF THEWORLD
Ben Martin
This paper first offers a standard modal extension of dialetheic logics that
respect the normal semantics for negation and conjunction, in an attempt to
adequately model absolutism, the thesis that there are true contradictions at
metaphysically possible worlds. It is shown, however, that the modal extension
has unsavoury consequences for both absolutism and dialetheism. While the
logic commits the absolutist to dialetheism, it commits the dialetheist to the
impossibility of the actual world. A new modal logic AV is then proposed
which avoids these unsavoury consequences by invalidating the
interdefinability rules for the modal operators with the use of two valuation
relations. However, while using AV carries no significant cost for the absolutist,
the same isn’t true for the dialetheist. Although using AV allows her to avoid
the consequence that the actual world is an impossible world, it does so only on
the condition that the dialetheist admits that she cannot give a dialetheic
solution to all self-referential semantic paradoxes. Thus, unless there are any
further available modal logics that don’t commit her to the impossibility of the
actual world, the dialetheist is faced with a dilemma. Either admit that the
actual world is an impossible world, or admit that her research programme
cannot give a comprehensive solution to the self-referential paradoxes.
Keywords: dialetheism, impossible worlds, paraconsistent logics,
contradictions.
Dialetheism is the view that there are true contradictions at the actual world
[Priest 2014: xxiii]. Call the view that there are true contradictions at a possi-
ble world ‘absolutism’. Intuitively, the entailment relation between the two
positions is asymmetrical. Dialetheism entails absolutism, but absolutism
doesn’t entail dialetheism. This is just a particular case of the general rule
that actuality entails possibility but possibility fails to entail actuality. Unsur-
prisingly, then, the two positions are distinguished in the dialetheic literature
(see Beall [2004: 6]). This paper asks whether there is an available logic that
adequately models absolutism as a philosophical position distinct from diale-
theism while respecting the normal semantics for conjunction and negation.1
1. Absolutism
Absolutism isn’t equivalent to paraconsistency. Absolutism proposes that a
contradiction C is true at a metaphysically possible world, whereas a logic
1That is, Conjunction: v(A ^ B) Dmin{v(A), v(B)}; and Negation: v(~A) D 1  v(A).
 2014 The Author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribu-
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needs only to invalidate explosion, {A, ~A} ‘ B, to be a paraconsistent
logic.2 Assuming that contradictions are formalized as ‘A ^ ~A’, absolut-
ism requires a special type of paraconsistent logic that not only invalidates
both the unconjoined {A, ~A} ‘ B and the conjoined {A ^ ~A} ‘ B forms
of explosion, thereby blocking triviality, but also allows contradictions to
be assigned the truth-value true. We will call these special paraconsistent
logics dialetheic logics, as they allow contradictions to be assigned the
truth-value true.
Not all paraconsistent logics are dialetheic logics. Both the preservationist
logics of Jennings and Schotch [1984] and Brown [2001], and the discursive
logic of Jaskowski [1969], fail to allow for contradictions to be assigned the
truth-value true while invalidating explosion. Thus, the set of dialetheic log-
ics is a proper subset of the set of paraconsistent logics, and one can be a
paraconsistent logician without being an absolutist, although, on pain of
triviality, the inverse isn’t true.
However, while there are logics, such as the preservationist and discursive
logics, which demonstrate that a paraconsistent logician isn’t committed to
absolutism or dialetheism, no logic yet has been produced which establishes
that absolutism doesn’t entail dialetheism. Therefore, although we have
three apparently conceptually distinct positions,
Dialetheism: There are true contradictions at the actual world
Absolutism: There are true contradictions at a metaphysically possible world
Paraconsistency: Explosion is invalid,
we don’t yet have logical evidence for the non-equivalence of absolutism and
dialetheism.
Why, though, should we bother with constructing a logic to accommo-
date absolutism? Well, even if we possess no good reasons at present to
believe that there are true contradictions at non-actual possible worlds but
not at the actual world, absolutism and dialetheism seem conceptually dis-
tinct positions. We should then be able to reflect this conceptual distinction
logically by constructing a system that adequately models the absolutist’s
theory without absolutism’s entailing dialetheism. If we find good reason
to believe that attempts to achieve this will fail, then we will have an interest-
ing case of possibility entailing actuality. Additionally, our present lack of
good reasons for admitting the truth of contradictions at a non-actual possi-
ble world without also admitting the truth of contradictions at the actual
world doesn’t ensure that we won’t find such reasons in the near future.3
2Actually, there are two respects in which the situation is more complex than this. Firstly, there are at least
two different forms of explosion, C-explosion {A, ~A} ‘ B and F-explosion ? ‘ B, and there are possible log-
ics in which C-explosion is invalid but F-explosion is valid (see Marcos [2005: ch. 1]). We are concerned solely
with C-explosion here, and thus will allow ourselves to refer uniquely to it with the term ‘explosion’. Sec-
ondly, there are logics such as Johansson’s [1937] ‘minimal calculus’, a positive fragment of intuitionistic
logic, in which although {A, ~A} ‘ B cannot be proven, a special instance of explosion such as {A, ~A} ‘ ~B
can. This is not ideal. In principle, one wants a definition of paraconsistency that ensures for any nary
placed connective and any arbitrary formulae B and C, both {A, ~A} 0B and {A, ~A} 0 B  C. For
more on how this might be achieved, see Urbas [1990]. Although a more fine-grained definition for paracon-
sistency is required, these necessary alterations would make no difference to our conclusions here. Thus, we
can simply use ‘those logics which invalidate explosion’ as our definition of paraconsistency.
3Although we won’t speculate on any particular cases here, such reasons might include admitting the possibil-
ity of the veridical perception of contradictory states, as suggested in Priest [1999].
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Given that it is only in the last 27 years, with Priest’s [1987] dialetheic solution
to certain semantic self-referential paradoxes, that the truth of contradictions
has become philosophically respectable, if contentious, it’s no surprise that
there’s been a lack of effort exerted in the search for such potential cases. We
should be willing to speculate philosophically and to attempt to build a logic
that accommodates absolutism, even before we have good reason to endorse
such a theory, just as Asenjo [1966] built a logic to model true contradictions
before the truth of contradictions had philosophical support.
Given that absolutism is a modal thesis, proposing that some contradic-
tions are true at a possible world, the position will require a modal extension
of a dialetheic logic if it’s to distinguish itself from dialetheism. In attempt-
ing to construct a logic suitable to model absolutism we will, firstly, propose
a modal extension of dialetheic propositional logics respecting the normal
semantics for conjunction and negation that provides a standard semantics
for the modal operators. Having shown that the logics resulting from these
standard semantics have unsavoury consequences for both absolutism and
dialetheism, we will then, secondly, propose a new modal logic AV that
avoids these consequences.
2. A Standard Modal Semantics
In building a modal dialetheic logic with standard modal semantics, for dia-
lectical purposes we will use Priest’s [1979] Logic of Paradox (LP) as our dia-
letheic propositional logic. However, the same conclusions follow from any
zero-order dialetheic logic that has the normal semantics for conjunction
and negation. If there are dialetheic logics that fail to fulfil these conditions,
such as da Costa’s [1974] C-Systems, then we need to question the suitability
of these logics to model absolutism independently of this paper’s
considerations.4
An interpretation for our modal extension of LP is a quadruple <W, wa,
R, e>. W is a set of possible worlds, wa is a distinguished member of our
domain known as the actual world, R is a binary relation between sets of
worlds known as the accessibility relation, and e is a valuation relation
assigning truth-values to world-indexed propositions (or, to put the point
another way, to proposition-world pairs).5 In this logic, valuations are rela-
tions between the world-indexed propositions and the set of truth-values {1,
0}, with each world-indexed proposition taking at least one truth-value. As
in LP, there are no truth-value gaps in the logic. Thus, world-indexed propo-
sitions can be true, false, or both (true and false).
The truth-values of complex world-indexed propositions are then defined
so as to mirror those of LP (w 2W):
4Dialetheists have so far been hesitant to use dialetheic logics with non-normal semantics for either conjunc-
tion or negation. For example, Priest and Routley [1989: 1656] have criticized the C-Systems’ negation for
being a sub-contrary, rather than a contradictory-forming, operator. Whether all absolutists would exhibit
the same hesitancy is an open question.
5To ensure the logic’s valuation relation isn’t mistaken for a valuation function we are using epsilon here,
rather than the customary ‘v’, to symbolize valuations.
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(A ^ B)we1 iff Awe1 and Bwe1
(A ^ B)we0 iff Awe0 or Bwe0
(A _ B)we1 iff Awe1 or Bwe1
(A _ B)we0 iff Awe0 and Bwe0
(~A)we1 iff Awe0
(~A)we0 iff Awe1
To provide the semantics of the modal operators for our modal extension of
LP, we need to assume a certain accessibility relation R, our binary relation
between sets of worlds. However, we don’t want to take a stand on which
accessibility relation is the most plausible or most suited to the absolutist’s
philosophical needs here. Therefore, we will assume an arbitrary accessibil-
ity relation R. The cogency of our point will hold, whichever accessibility
relation we use, as long as some possible but non-actual worlds are accessible
from the actual world. Now, translating the standard semantics for necessity
and possibility into our talk of valuations as relations between proposition-
world pairs and the set of truth-values {1, 0}, we get:
(&A)we1 iff, for all w0 2W such that wRw0, Aw0e1
(&A)we0 iff, for some w0 2W such that wRw0, Aw0e0
(A)we1 iff, for some w0 2W such that wRw0, Aw0e1
(A)we0 iff, for all w0 2W such that wRw0, Aw0e0
These definitions retain the intuition that a proposition p is necessary at a
possible world w if and only if p is true at every world accessible from w,
that p is not necessary at w if and only if p is false at some world(s) accessible
from w, that p is possible at w if and only if p is true at some world(s) accessi-
ble from w, and that p is not possible at w if and only if p is false at every
world accessible from w. Here then we have a modal extension of LP that
contains the standard semantics for the possibility and necessity operators.
Now, the modal dialetheic logic that these standard modal semantics pro-
duce can be shown to have two problematic consequences, one solely for
absolutism and the other for absolutism and dialetheism alike. These conse-
quences motivate a revision of the logic for both positions’ sakes.
3. Consequence One: From Possibility to Actuality
Unfortunately for absolutism, it can be shown that the modal dialetheic
logic resulting from these standard modal semantics allows contradictions
at a possible world to permeate into the modal level. This entails that if a
contradiction is true at a possible world accessible from the actual world
then there is a true contradiction at the actual world.
Consider a possible world w1 accessible from the actual world wa. Follow-
ing the absolutist’s thesis, allow for there to be a proposition p at w1 that
takes both truth-values. Given the meaning of conjunction and negation
64 Ben Martin
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above, p ^ ~p takes the truth-value true at w1, as well as taking the truth-
value false. There is nothing new here. In LP, any proposition q that is the
conjunction of a proposition p and p’s negation, when p takes both truth-
values, also has both truth-values. We, therefore, have a world accessible
from wa at which a contradiction is true. Irrespective of the truth of any con-
tradiction at any other possible world w 2 W, we have, at the actual world
wa,
(p ^ ~p)wae1.
This isn’t the end of the story, though. For at all possible worlds, either
accessible or inaccessible from wa, it’s easy to see that, for every proposition
p, the conjunction of p and its negation ~p takes the truth-value false, what-
ever truth-value p takes, even if p ^ ~p sometimes also takes the truth-value
true. Therefore, given the semantics of the possibility operator above, it’s
also going to be false at the actual world wa that (p ^ ~p). This entails, given
the meaning of negation above, that at the actual world wa,
~(p ^ ~p)wae1.
Consequently, we can derive a contradiction at the modal level, as the rule
of adjunction is valid.6
Thus, if the absolutist were to model her theory with this modal dialetheic
logic using the standard semantics for the modal operators, by allowing for
at least one proposition p to be both true and false at a possible world acces-
sible from wa, she would be committed to a contradiction at the actual
world. Absolutism would become a subspecies of dialetheism.7 Conse-
quently, this modal extension of dialetheic logics with standard modal
semantics fails to ensure the separation of absolutism and dialetheism. If
absolutism is to be a distinct philosophical position from dialetheism, then it
requires a different modal logic. In particular, the position must use either
non-normal semantics for negation and/or conjunction, or non-standard
semantics for the modal operators.
In contrast, this consequence of the standard modal semantics is encour-
aging for the dialetheist. It gives her a new avenue in which to establish that
there are some true contradictions at the actual world. Rather than relying
on semantic or set-theoretic paradoxes, she can conclude that there are true
contradictions at the actual world if she can establish that there are true con-
tradictions at non-actual possible worlds accessible from the actual world.
6The same point could also be demonstrated here with the necessity operator, given the interdefinability of
the modal operators.
7Subsequent to the writing of this paper, it was pointed out to me that in Asmus [2012] a similar point is made
using model theory. There is one, not inconsequential, difference between our results, however. While Asmus
is interested in showing that paraconsistent logicians are committed to dialetheism, given certain assump-
tions, my interest here is with the non-equivalent task of showing that a standard modal extension of diale-
theic logics respecting the normal semantics for conjunction and negation commits an absolutist to
dialetheism. While the preservationist logics of Jennings and Schotch [1984] and Brown [2001] seem to be
counterexamples to Asmus’s claim, in that these paraconsistent logics don’t entail true contradictions even if
we have an interpretational understanding of cases, they aren’t relevant to my claim here as they are not diale-
theic logics.
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She can potentially justify her claim that there are true contradictions by
looking to the fruitful grounds of possibility. Unfortunately for the dialethe-
ist, the second consequence of the semantics is far less encouraging.
4. Consequence Two: The Possibility of Impossibility
Interpreted naturally, a consequence of the modal extension of LP above is
that the absolutist is committed to saying that it’s impossible for contradic-
tions to be true. By necessitation of the theorem ~(p ^ ~p) we can derive
&~(p ^ ~p), and given the interdefinability of the necessity and possibility
operators we can derive ~(p ^ ~p). Now, interpreted naturally, this formula
reads as ‘It’s impossible for the conjunction of a proposition p and p’s nega-
tion to be true’, or ‘It’s impossible for a contradiction to be true.’ Given that
an impossible world is a world w where propositions that cannot possibly be
true are true, any world w at which a contradiction is true is going to be an
impossible world, according to the modal semantics given above. In con-
junction with the absolutist’s hypothesis that there are possible worlds at
which contradictions are true, this entails that the absolutist is committed to
the proposition that at least some impossible worlds are possible worlds. Yet
to admit that some impossible worlds are also possible worlds seems to strip
impossibility of the theoretical role that the concept plays. If a world w’s
being an impossible world doesn’t preclude that it’s also a possible world,
then it’s unclear what function the concept of impossibility serves. Conse-
quently, by endorsing this modal dialetheic logic with standard modal
semantics, the absolutist would be taking on the burden of explaining what
theoretical role the concept of impossibility plays if it doesn’t preclude
possibility.8
Additionally, by allowing possibility and impossibility to intersect, this
modal dialetheic logic also entails the troubling consequence that absolutism
cannot logically preclude the actual world being an impossible world. Imag-
ine that the absolutist accepts the modal dialetheic logic above and then we
find good reason to believe that at the actual world there is a true contradic-
tion, which isn’t precluded by the absolutist’s theory. This would commit
the absolutist to the thesis that the actual world, as well as being a possible
world, is an impossible world, given that a contradiction would be true at it.
This is somewhat perplexing. After all, an impossible world is one that
couldn’t be realized, whereas the actual world is. Whatever the actual world
is, it doesn’t seem to be an impossible world. However, by using the standard
modal semantics above, and not precluding the truth of contradictions at the
actual world, the absolutist would fail to preclude the impossibility of the
actual world, again placing a considerable burden on her theory. Thus, by
using this modal dialetheic logic, the absolutist would take on the burden of
8As this unsavoury consequence of the standard modal semantics depends upon the notion of impossible
worlds, any argument based upon this consequence must resist any concerns over the coherence of impossible
worlds, such as found in Lewis [1986]. Although any suitable response to these concerns is far beyond the
scope of this paper, the theoretical usefulness of impossible worlds, as argued for by Nolan [1997], suggests
that we may well be able to speak coherently about them. Many thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing
out this concern.
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providing an account of impossibility that made it plausible both for some
possible worlds to be impossible worlds and for the concept of impossibility
to fail to preclude the impossibility of the actual world.
This unsavoury consequence of the modal dialetheic logic above is
equally, if not more, troublesome for the dialetheist. The dialetheist, like all
of us, needs to be able to model modal claims, and given that she allows for
true contradictions at the actual world, she needs to allow for true contradic-
tions at possible worlds. The most obvious way of her achieving this, how-
ever, is by providing a modal dialetheic logic with the standard modal
semantics. Yet a consequence of this logic is that all worlds at which contra-
dictions are true are impossible worlds. Given that the dialetheist endorses
the truth of some contradictions at the actual world, the logic subsequently
commits her to the actual world being an impossible world. This, again,
seems to put strain on the whole notion of an impossible world. Conse-
quently, by using the modal dialetheic logic with standard modal semantics
above, dialetheism would also take on the burden of providing a plausible
definition of impossibility that can accommodate the impossibility of the
actual world.
Nothing that has been said here precludes the possibility of the absolutist
or dialetheist providing just such a plausible definition of impossibility that
accommodates the impossibility of some possible worlds, which includes the
actual world in the dialetheist’s case. 9 After all, once we admit that contra-
dictions can be true many wonderful things become possible. However, we
can say with some confidence both that the dialetheist has shown no sign so
far of being willing to accept that the actual world is an impossible world,10
and that it isn’t obvious that the definitions of impossible worlds and situa-
tions that prominent dialetheists use can plausibly accommodate the impos-
sibility of the actual world. For example, Priest [2014: xxiii] defines an
impossible world as ‘one where the laws of logic are different from those of
the actual world’, while Beall defines impossible situations as situations that
can ‘never be actualized’ and ‘never [be] part of any possible world’ [Beall
and Restall 2001: sec. 4]. Now, given that both Priest and Beall are dialethe-
ists, it’s an option for either to accept the respective contradictions that
would arise from their definitions of impossible worlds or situations if they
admitted that the actual world was both a possible and impossible world.11
While Priest could accept that the logical laws of the actual world are both
identical and non-identical to themselves, Beall could propose that impossi-
ble worlds can be both actualized and not actualized. However, dialetheists
don’t wish to accept the truth of just any contradiction. As with all proposi-
tions, they only wish to endorse those contradictions that we have good rea-
son to believe are true. Therefore, if the dialetheist wants to endorse either
of these contradictions, we are owed an explanation for both why we have
9Many thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this point.
10Priest makes it clear in an added footnote in Lewis [2004] that he doesn’t want to say that true contradic-
tions at the actual world entail that the actual world is an impossible world.
11Beall’s definition of impossible situations only entails a contradiction in conjunction with the impossibility
of the actual world if we assume that impossible worlds contain impossible situations, so that if an impossible
situation can never be actualized then neither can an impossible world. However, this seems a reasonable
assumption to make for the sake of our discussion.
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good reason to believe they are true and why they are theoretically unprob-
lematic for the concept of impossibility. At present, not enough has been
said in the literature on the repercussions of dialetheism for our common
understanding of impossibility and impossible worlds.
The absolutist and dialetheist have the choice, therefore, of either (a)
or (b):
(a) endorsing a modal dialetheic logic that both respects the normal
semantics for negation and conjunction and uses standard modal
semantics, such as the logic given above, whilst taking on the burden
of accommodating worlds that are both possible and impossible and,
in the dialetheist’s case, the impossibility of the actual world;
(b) avoiding these consequences by endorsing a different modal dialetheic
logic, which requires using either non-normal semantics for negation
and/or conjunction or non-standard semantics for the modal operators.
Consequently, to avoid either of the unsavoury consequences we have con-
sidered, an alternative modal dialetheic logic is required. If no suitable alter-
native logic can be found then, firstly, absolutism will be condemned to the
status of being a sub-species of dialetheism. Secondly, the absolutist will be
required to offer an explanation of how we can make sense of the impossibil-
ity of some possible worlds, and the dialetheist will be committed to the
actual world being an impossible world. Thus, if there are no available logics
that avoid either of these unsavoury consequences, then both absolutism
and dialetheism face substantial philosophical challenges.
5. Possible Solution to the Problem
If the absolutist is going to block both the occurrence of true contradictions
at the actual world and the possibility of impossible worlds, then she will
need to invalidate the interdefinability rules for the modal operators. While,
through necessitation, &~(p ^ ~p) must be a theorem of the absolutist’s
logic, given the normal semantics for conjunction and negation, and she
must be able to derive (p ^ ~p) to allow for true contradictions at possible
worlds, these commitments cause problems when conjoined with the interde-
finability of the modal operators. As the absolutist cannot sanction the rejec-
tion of either commitment, the interdefinability of the modal operators must
be invalidated somehow. While the occurrence of true contradictions at the
actual world is caused by both interdefinability rules,
A D ~&~A
&~A D ~A,
the second consequence of the standard modal semantics above, that some
impossible worlds are possible worlds, is a consequence of the second inter-
definability rule. Thus, the absolutist can avoid both of the unsavoury conse-
quences by invalidating the interdefinability rules for the modal operators.
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However, given that the absolutist is committed to both allowing for true
contradictions and, under the present proposal, respecting the normal
semantics for negation and conjunction, she cannot invalidate the interdefin-
ability rules for the modal operators by just any means. Firstly, if negation is
to keep its truth-reversing properties, as dictated by its normal semantics,
then the only way to block the occurrence of contradictions involving modal
formulae, and consequently the intersection of possibility and impossibility,
is to ensure that modal formulae never take both truth-values. Conse-
quently, the absolutist must invalidate the interdefinability rules for the
modal operators whilst ensuring that modal formulae only take one truth-
value. Secondly, given that the absolutist must still allow for true contradic-
tions by ensuring that non-modal formulae can be assigned both truth-val-
ues, it’s clear that she must ensure that modal formulae cannot be assigned
both truth-values by altering the semantics for the modal operators, rather
than by precluding tout court the possibility of formulae being assigned both
truth-values.
To see how the absolutist could alter her modal semantics to preclude the
possibility of modal formulae being assigned both truth-values, whilst allow-
ing non-modal propositions to be both true and false, we can look to how
one could intuitively avoid the intersection of possibility and impossibility
whilst assuming a dialetheic propositional logic. Given the normal semantics
of negation, formulae of the form ~A take the truth-value true at a world w
if and only if A is false at w. Consequently, given standard modal seman-
tics, ~A is true at w in virtue of A being false at all worlds accessible from
w, which means that A is impossible at w in virtue of being false at the worlds
accessible from w. Given a dialetheic propositional logic in which proposi-
tional parameters can be assigned both truth-values, however, these modal
semantics don’t preclude both A and ~A being true at w, as A may take
both truth-values at some accessible world. Thus, to ensure that A and ~A
cannot both be true at a world w in such a logic, one needs to provide the
conditions under which A is false at a world, and thus the conditions under
which ~A is true, not in terms of the falsity of A at accessible worlds, which
doesn’t preclude A’s truth at these worlds, but in terms of another property,
such as A’s failing to be true at these accessible worlds. By providing the
truth conditions of the modal operators in terms of a proposition’s being
true at the relevant accessible worlds, and the falsity conditions in terms of a
proposition’s failing to be true at the relevant accessible worlds, these seman-
tics would ensure that modal formulae couldn’t take both truth-values, pro-
vided we could successfully preclude the possibility of a proposition both
being true and failing to be true. If realized, these semantics would allow for
the absolutist to retain the standard conditions under which A is possible at
a world w, whilst ensuring the mutual exclusivity of possibility and impossi-
bility by changing the conditions under which A is impossible at w (and simi-
larly for necessity).
To successfully preclude the possibility of modal formulae being assigned
both truth-values, this solution requires the absolutist to possess the logical
apparatus necessary to ensure that the truth-value true isn’t a member of the
truth-values that a proposition-world pair takes. This we will achieve by
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proposing a new modal logic that posits two primitive valuation relations,
rather than one.
Our new logic AV is a quintuple, <W, wa, R, e
+, e¡>. Only the final ele-
ment differs from our previous logic, with ‘e+’ symbolizing the valuation
relation for the logic, just as ‘e’ did before. This new element, e¡, rather than
symbolizing the valuation relation for the logic, symbolizes the logic’s anti-
valuation relation. Although the idea of having two valuation relations in a
logic may seem bizarre, it’s worth persevering with as its results are fruitful
for both the absolutist and dialetheist. There is an obvious analogy at work
here between the valuation and anti-valuation relations and the extension
and anti-extension of a predicate. Thus, a proposition-world pair pw will
have both a valuation set and an anti-valuation set. The valuation set of pw
will be dictated by the truth-values to which pw has the relation e
+, and the
anti-valuation set of pw will be dictated by the truth-values to which pw has
the relation e¡. We will presently discuss some of the properties that the two
valuation relations possess. With regards to the accessibility relation R,
again we don’t want to make too many assumptions about the accessibility
relation which would best suit the absolutist and dialetheist. All we require
for our purposes here are the weak requirements that the relation is reflexive
and that the distinguished world wa has some non-distinguished possible
worlds accessible from it.
As before, valuations are relations from proposition-world pairs to the set
of truth-values {1, 0}, and our anti-valuations here are similarly relations
from proposition-world pairs to the set of truth-values {1, 0}. Now, for the
semantics to deliver the results we require, we must make two assumptions
about the valuation and anti-valuation sets for each proposition-world pair.
Firstly, we need to assume that the valuation and anti-valuation sets parti-
tion the set of truth-values {true, false} for each proposition-world pair.
Thus, for any proposition-world pw and truth-value t:
Either pwe
+t or pwe
¡t, and it’s not the case that both pwe+t and pwe¡t.
These conditions ensure that for every proposition-world pair pw, each
truth-value t is a member of pw’s valuation or anti-valuation set, but not
both.12 The second assumption, to ensure that the semantics for the logic
aren’t gappy, is that the valuation set for every proposition-world pair pw
must be non-empty. These assumptions ensure that although a proposition-
world pair pw can have the valuation relation to both true and false, pw can
only have the anti-valuation relation to either true or false.
Given these restrictions on the anti-valuation relation, it seems reasonable
to consider the relation to be communicating which truth-values are not
members of the valuation set of a proposition-world pair pw. Thus, the anti-
valuation set of a proposition-world pair pw is hypothesized, at least, to be
able to communicate when pw is untrue (pwe
+0 and pwe
¡1) and unfalse (pwe+1
12One might rightly wonder whether we can simply stipulate that a truth-value t cannot be a member of both
the valuation and anti-valuation set of a proposition-world pair pw. After all, the possibility of such stipulated
mutual exclusivity failing is one of the lessons learnt from dialetheism. We will consider this possibility later.
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and pwe
¡0), as well as both true and false (pwe+{1,0} and pwe¡;). This makes
the anti-valuation relation similar to the classical negation used when claim-
ing that a proposition p is ‘not true’ or ‘not false’, with the intention of pre-
cluding p’s falsity and truth, respectively. Priest [1990, 2007: 46971] has
argued that we cannot interpret these nots classically without begging the
question against the dialetheist. AV makes this hypothesized mutual exclu-
sivity of the relations explicit by stipulating that for no proposition-world
pair pw and truth-value t is it the case that both pwe
+t and pwe
¡t. Again,
whether we can ensure such mutual exclusivity through stipulation is some-
thing we will discuss later. The hope for AV is that it can avoid accusations
of begging the question against the dialetheist, as the dialetheist’s endorse-
ment of the logic is ultimately in her best interests.
Critically for the absolutist and dialetheist, AV’s semantics allow for con-
tradictions to be true at a world. We can see this by giving the dual truth-
conditions of the truth-functional connectives using both valuation
relations:
(A ^ B)we+1 iff Awe+1 and Bwe+1
(A ^ B)we+0 iff Awe+0 or Bwe+0
(A ^ B)we¡1 iff Awe¡1 or Bwe¡1
(A ^ B)we¡0 iff Awe¡0 and Bwe¡0
(A _ B)we+1 iff Awe+1 or Bwe+1
(A _ B)we+0 iff Awe+0 and Bwe+0
(A _ B)we¡1 iff Awe¡1 and Bwe¡1
(A _ B)we¡0 iff Awe¡0 or Bwe¡0
(~A)we
+1 iff Awe
+0
(~A)we
+0 iff Awe
+1
(~A)we
¡1 iff Awe¡0
(~A)we
¡0 iff Awe¡1
If a proposition-world pair pw has the valuation relation to both truth and
falsity, pwe
+{1,0}, then both pwe
+1 and ~pwe
+1. Consequently, we have
(p ^ ~p)we+1, which ensures that we can have true contradictions at a world,
while retaining the intuitive consequence that all contradictions are false at
every world, (p ^ ~p)we+0. AV therefore fulfils the suitability requirement
for the absolutist and dialetheist of allowing contradictions to be assigned
the truth-value true.
What we now need are semantics for the modal operators that invalidate
the interdefinability rules. We can achieve this by giving the semantics for
the modal operators exclusively in terms of truth:
(&A)we
+1 iff, for all w0 2W such that wRw0, Aw0e+1
(&A)we
+0 iff, for some w0 2W such that wRw0, Aw0e¡1
(A)we+1 iff, for some w0 2W such that wRw0, Aw0e+1
(A)we+0 iff, for all w0 2W such that wRw0, Aw0e¡1
We don’t require the dual anti-valuation conditions for the modal operators,
as they are redundant for our purposes. This is ensured by AV’s not
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permitting a truth-value t to be a member of both the valuation and anti-val-
uation sets of a proposition-world pair pw.
Whether modal formulae have the valuation true or false is dependent only
on whether the formulae in question have the valuation or anti-valuation
relation to true at the relevant possible worlds. Under the assumption that
for no world-proposition pair pw and truth-value t is it the case that both
pwe
+t and pwe
¡t, the truth and falsity of modal propositions become mutually
exclusive, invalidating the interdefinability rules for the modal operators and,
consequently, blocking the occurrence modal contradictions.
While the formula (p ^ ~p) takes the valuation true at the actual world wa
in some interpretations, as the absolutist allows for a possible world w0
accessible from wa such that (p ^ ~p)w0e+1, the formula ~&~(p ^ ~p) only
takes the valuation false at wa in every interpretation, as &~(p ^ ~p)wae+1
but not &~(p ^ ~p)wae+0. Given that, for every possible world w accessible
from wa, ~(p ^ ~p)we+1, the occurrence of a possible world w0 accessible
from wa such that ~(p ^ ~p)w0e¡1 is precluded. Therefore, given AV’s seman-
tics for the necessity operator and negation, we don’t have&~(p ^ ~p)wae+0,
or consequently ~&~(p ^ ~p)wae+1, in any interpretation that(p ^ ~p)wae+1. The interdefinability of A and ~&~A fails.
Similarly, while&~(p ^ ~p) has the valuation true at wa in every interpre-
tation, for at every world w accessible from wa ~(p ^ ~p)we+1, ~(p ^ ~p)
only has the valuation false at the actual world wa in some interpretations.
Given that (p ^ ~p)wae+1 in some interpretations, for the reasons already
given, the occurrence of ~(p ^ ~p)wae+1 is precluded in those interpretations
as this would require both (p ^ ~p)wae+1 and (p ^ ~p)wae+0, which subse-
quently requires there to be a world w0 accessible from wa at which both
(p ^ ~p)w0e+1 and (p ^ ~p)w0e¡1, which is precluded by AV’s semantics.
Therefore, there are interpretations of AV in which we don’t have both
&~(p ^ ~p)wae+1 and ~(p ^ ~p)wae+1. The interdefinability of &~A and
~A fails.
As we have stipulated that a truth-value t cannot be a member of both a
proposition-world pair pw’s valuation and anti-valuation sets, we can easily
show that there’s no interpretation in which either (&A ^ ~&A)we+1 or
(A ^ ~A)we+1, for any formula A and world w. Given the truth-conditions
of conjunction and negation above, for the modal contradictions to have the
valuation true would require that (&A)we
+{1,0} and (A)we+{1,0}, respec-
tively. However, for either to occur in an interpretation would require that
A contained the truth-value true in both its valuation and anti-valuation sets
at some world w0 accessible from w. Given that both Aw0e+1 and Aw’e¡1 can’t
occur together in an interpretation in AV, no contradictions constituted by
modal formulae have the valuation true in AV. That there is no interpreta-
tion in which (A ^ ~A)we+1 is also enough to demonstrate that there’s no
world w that is both a possible and impossible world. Possibility and impos-
sibility cannot intersect in AV. So, if for some contradiction C we have
Cwae
+1, as the dialetheist theorizes, we are not then committed to the actual
world being an impossible world, as AV’s semantics don’t permit ~Cwae+1,
given that Cwae+1 is ensured by R’s reflexivity. Accordingly, given AV’s
consequence relation,
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S AV B iff for all interpretations <W, wa, R, e+, e¡> and all w 2 W, if Ae+1
for all A 2 S, then Be+1,
propositions of the form ~(A ^ ~A)w aren’t logical truths in AV, as in some
interpretations there’s a possible world w0 such that (p ^ ~p)w0e+1.13
AV delivers an intuitive semantics for the modal operators whilst ensuring
that both of the interdefinability rules are invalidated. Consequently, both
of the unsavoury consequences of the modal dialetheic logic with standard
modal semantics we considered can be avoided. AV delivers everything we
need from it, on the assumption, at least, that for no truth-value t and prop-
osition-world pair pw is there a permitted interpretation in which both pwe
+t
and pwe
¡t. It is to this stipulated partitioning of the set of truth-values that
we now move, along with the dilemma it poses for the dialetheist.
6. Stipulating Exclusivity and a Dilemma for the Dialetheist
The exclusivity of truth and falsity for modal formulae, and thus modal
propositions, is ensured only by the hypothesized mutual exclusivity of the
valuation and anti-valuation relations e+ and e¡ for every proposition-world
pair pw and truth-value t. If this mutual exclusivity breaks down then so
does the mutual exclusivity of truth and falsity for modal formulae, and the
same problems reappear for absolutism. Thus, we need assurances that the
absolutist can guarantee that pwe
+t and pwe
¡t cannot occur together in an
interpretation for any proposition-world pair pw and true-value t. Yet we
know that simply stipulating mutual exclusivity isn’t enough. Just as self-ref-
erential sentences threaten the mutual exclusivity of truth and falsity
although the classical logician stipulates their mutual exclusivity, so self-ref-
erential sentences can threaten the mutual exclusivity of pwe
+t and pwe
¡t.
Consequently, if the absolutist is going to make AV’s semantics viable, and
ensure that her position doesn’t have the previously mentioned unsavoury
consequences, she faces the same challenge that the classical logician does—
to give a non-dialetheic response to certain self-referential sentences. If the
absolutist wishes to stop her position from dissolving into dialetheism, how-
ever, this is hardly a new obligation. Allowing for true contradictions at
non-actual possible worlds, whilst demurring on the question of true contra-
dictions at the actual world, already required her to avoid a dialetheic solu-
tion to the self-referential paradoxes. If the mutual exclusivity stipulated by
AV requires something more of the absolutist who doesn’t want to endorse
dialetheism, it’s simply that she must double her efforts to give non-diale-
theic solutions to the self-referential paradoxes. Otherwise, absolutism is
destined to be a sub-species of dialetheism.
The predicament for the dialetheist with regard to AV is far more interest-
ing. The dialetheist herself requires the semantics of AV if she’s to block the
13AV possesses further interesting properties whose details are beyond the scope of this paper. These include
AV’s validation of two forms of modal explosion, {&A ^ ~&A} AV B and {A ^ ~A} AV B, and the
potential inclusion of a consistency operator in AV that allows for the recapture of classical validity (as in da
Costa’s [1974] C-Systems).
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unsavoury consequence that the actual world is an impossible world. For
AV to achieve this, however, the dialetheist must maintain the mutual exclu-
sivity of pwe
+t and pwe
¡t for every proposition-world pair pw and true-value
t. Yet the dialetheist is famously uneasy with such stipulated mutual exclu-
sivity, due to our ability in natural languages to form troublesome self-refer-
ential sentences such as (λ):
(λ) λ has the anti-valuation true [λe¡1].
As with other self-referential sentences, the dialetheist would like to say that
(λ) both has and doesn’t have the anti-valuation true, entailing that both
λwe
+1 and λwe
¡1, contrary to the stipulation of AV. This desire to give a dia-
letheic solution to (λ) poses a dilemma for the dialetheist.
The dialetheist, if she’s to avoid taking on a substantial theoretical bur-
den, needs to guarantee that her theory doesn’t entail that the actual world
is an impossible world. This requires, under the present proposal of AV,
ensuring the mutual exclusivity of pwe
+t and pwe
¡t for all proposition-world
pairs pw and truth-values t. Yet the only way in which the dialetheist can
maintain this mutual exclusivity is by giving a non-dialetheic solution to (λ)
above. Therefore, unless a new modal semantics can be introduced that
removes this dilemma, the dialetheist must choose between endorsing the
claim that the actual world is an impossible world or admitting that there is
at least one self-referential sentence that cannot be given a dialetheic
response, putting at risk the comprehensiveness of her own research
programme.14
7. Conclusion
In AV we have found a modal dialetheic logic that possesses the properties
necessary to model absolutism as a philosophical position distinct from dia-
letheism while respecting the normal semantics for negation and conjunc-
tion. However, to ensure AV’s viability for her purposes the absolutist must
still meet the challenge of self-referential sentences such as (λ) that threaten
the mutual exclusivity of the valuation relations. There is nothing we can do
within AV to preclude conclusively the relations’ non-exclusivity; this is
something that dialetheism has taught us. If the absolutist is to prevent abso-
lutism from dissolving into dialetheism, she must argue for the valuation
relations’ mutual exclusivity by dealing head on with self-referential senten-
ces such as (λ). Fortunately for the absolutist, unless the dialetheist has any
other modal dialetheic logics available to her that don’t entail the impossibil-
ity of the actual world, the dialetheist herself has good reason not to dispute
the stipulated mutual exclusivity of pwe
+t and pwe
¡t. After all, for the diale-
theist, it is a choice between accepting AV’s semantics and taking on the
14This paper leaves open the possibility of there being other modal dialetheic logics that avoid the conse-
quence that the actual world is an impossible world without compromising the comprehensiveness of the dia-
letheist’s research programme. If the dialetheist wants to avoid this dilemma, however, then the onus is on
her to find such a logic.
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burden of accommodating the impossibility of the actual world. Therefore,
in AV’s facilitating the dialetheist’s avoidance of this consequence, the abso-
lutist may find assurances that the dialetheist will be as determined as she is
to maintain the mutual exclusivity of pwe
+t and pwe
¡t. Those who would
normally question the mutual exclusivity of semantic categories have, on
this occasion, good reason to argue for their exclusivity, though at the risk
of damaging the comprehensiveness of their own research programme by
admitting a non-dialetheic solution to (λ). Consequently, unless there are
alternative modal dialetheic semantics available which don’t entail the
impossibility of the actual world, the sole possibility threatening AV’s suit-
ability to model absolutism is the potential for the dialetheist to bite the bul-
let and to admit that the actual world is indeed an impossible world.15
University College London Received: January 2014
Revised: August 2014
References
Asenjo, F.G. 1966. A Calculus of Antinomies, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 7/1: 1035.
Asmus, C. 2012. Paraconsistency on the Rocks of Dialetheism, Logique et Analyse 55/217: 321.
Beall, J.C. 2004. Introduction: At the Intersection of Truth and Falsity, in The Law of Non-Contradiction:
New Philosophical Essays, ed. G. Priest, J.C. Beall, and B. Armour-Garb, Oxford: Clarendon Press:
119.
Beall, J.C. and G. Restall 2001. Defending Logical Pluralism, in Logical Consequence: Rival Approaches, Pro-
ceedings of the 1999 Conference of the Society of Exact Philosophy, ed. J. Woods and B. Brown, Stan-
more: Hermes: 122.
Brown, B. 2001. Simple Natural Deduction for Weakly Aggregative Paraconsistent Logics, in Frontiers of
Paraconsistent Logic, ed. D. Gabbay, Exeter: Research Studies Press: 13748.
da Costa, N.C.A. 1974. On the Theory of Inconsistent Formal Systems, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic
15/4: 497510.
Jaskowski, S. 1969. Propositional Calculus for Contradictory Deductive Systems, Studia Logica 24/1:
14357.
Jennings, R.E. and P.K. Scotch 1984. The Preservation of Coherence, Studia Logica 43/12: 89106.
Johansson, I. 1937. Der Minimalkalk€ul, ein reduzierter intuitionistischer Formalismus, Compositio Mathe-
matica 4/1: 11936.
Lewis, D. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Lewis, D. 2004. Letters to Beall and Priest, in The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays, ed.
G. Priest, JC. Beall, and B. Armour-Garb, Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1767.
Marcos, J. 2005. Logics of Formal Inconsistency, PhD thesis, Universidade Tecnica De Lisboa, Portugal.
Nolan, D. 1997. Impossible Worlds: A Modest Approach, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38/4:
53572.
Priest, G. 1979. Logic of Paradox, Journal of Philosophical Logic 8/1: 21941.
Priest, G. 1987. In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.
Priest, G. 1990. Boolean Negation and All That, Journal of Philosophical Logic 19/2: 20115.
Priest, G. 1999. Perceiving Contradictions, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77/4: 43946.
Priest, G. 2007. Reply to Slater, in Handbook of Paraconsistency, ed. J-Y. Beziau, W. Carnielli, and D. Gab-
bay, London: College Publications: 46774.
Priest, G. 2014. One: Being an Investigation into the Unity of Reality and of its Parts, including the Singular
Object which is Nothingness, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Priest, G. and R. Routley 1989. Systems of Paraconsistent Logic, in Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the
Inconsistent, ed. G. Priest, R. Routley, and J. Norman, M€unchen: Philosophia Verlag: 15186.
Urbas, I. 1990. Paraconsistency, Studies in Soviet Thought 39/34: 34354.
15I am grateful to two anonymous referees for their detailed comments on a previous version of this paper.
Dialetheism and the impossibility of the world 75
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 C
oll
eg
e L
on
do
n]
 at
 04
:55
 07
 M
ay
 20
15
 
